

CEASEFIRE OBSERVATORY

The Israeli – Lebanese Ceasefire

A year in review

Monthly Monitoring Report

Middle East Institute for Research and Strategic Studies (MEIRSS)

November 2025

Prepared by Taline Nohra, Clara Daaboul

MEIRSS

Executive Summary

Over the year since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, the agreement prevented an immediate, large-scale resumption of war along the Israel-Lebanon border, but it did not produce durable calm. Instead the year saw repeated tactical violence, air and drone strikes, targeted killings, and occasional ground incursions producing fatalities, injuries, and localised displacement in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL and the Mechanism Committee created formal channels to monitor incidents and coordinate diplomacy; the UN Security Council renewed UNIFIL's mandate (Resolution 2790, Aug 28, 2025) but set a final term that raised questions about future monitoring capacity. Major diplomatic actors (United States, France, Qatar, Egypt, UN) engaged in active mediation and proposals for staged disarmament tied to Israeli withdrawal, but Hezbollah's refusal to disarm and Israel's insistence on implementing the agreement and verifiable reductions in Hezbollah capability, left the core problems unresolved. Key high-risk incidents in 2025 especially those that endangered UNIFIL patrols and LAF personnel sharpened international concern and showed the ceasefire's fragility.

الملخص التنفيذي

على مدى العام الذي تلا وقف إطلاق النار في ٢٧ تشرين الثاني ٢٠٢٤ بين إسرائيل وحزب الله، حال الاتفاق دون عودة فورية وواسعة النطاق للقتال على طول الحدود اللبنانية-الإسرائيلية، لكنه لم ينجح في ترسيخ تهدئة دائمة. بدلاً من ذلك، شهد العام سلسلة متواصلة من العنف التكتيكي، وضربات جوية وبالطائرات المسيّرة، وعمليات اغتيال محدّدة، وتوغلات برية متقطّعة أدّت إلى سقوط قتلى وجرحى ونزوح محلي في جنوب لبنان. قامت قوات اليونيفيل ولجنة الآلية بإنشاء قنوات رسمية لرصد الحوادث وتنسيق الجهود الدبلوماسية، في حين جدّد مجلس الأمن ولاية اليونيفيل (القرار ٢٧٩٠ الصادر في ٢٨ آب ٢٠٢٥) مع تحديد مدة نهائية أثارت تساؤلات حول قدرة البعثة على المراقبة مستقبلاً. أما على المستوى الدبلوماسي، فقد شاركت جهات دولية رئيسية (الولايات المتحدة، فرنسا، قطر، مصر، الأمم المتحدة) في وساطات مكثّفة وطرحت مقترحات لنزع سلاح تدريجي مرتبط بانسحاب إسرائيلي مرحلي. غير أن رفض حزب الله نزع سلاحه وإصرار إسرائيل على تطبيق بنود الاتفاق وخفض ملموس في قدرات حزب الله قبل أي انسحاب، أبقى جوهر الإشكالية من دون حل. كما أن الحوادث الخطرة خلال عام ٢٠٢٥، ولا سيما تلك التي عرّضت دوريات اليونيفيل وعناصر الجيش اللبناني للخطر، زادت من القلق الدولي وأبرزت هشاشة وقف إطلاق النار.

Background of the ceasefire

After Hezbollah entered the confrontation in support of Gaza only hours after the 7 October attacks. From that moment, the northern front transformed into a continuous cycle of cross-border strikes: Hezbollah began by firing guided missiles, anti-tank rockets, and drones at Israeli military positions along the Blue Line, while Israel responded with artillery, precision airstrikes, and targeted attacks deeper inside southern Lebanon. As the conflict expanded, Israeli drone and airstrikes increasingly targeted senior Hezbollah field commanders, destroying command posts and vehicles and hitting areas in Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Tyre, and the Bekaa. By mid-2024, these assassinations and counter-strikes intensified, with several high-profile Hezbollah commanders killed in consecutive operations, raising fears that the limited northern front could collapse

Because the fighting persisted for months with no signs of de-escalation – and because each strike was followed by an even stronger retaliatory strike – speeches, warnings, and political statements from all sides increased. Hezbollah repeatedly declared that the “southern support front” would remain active as long as the Gaza war continued, while Israel publicly stated it would not tolerate Hezbollah’s presence near the border. This cycle placed enormous pressure on Lebanon, Israel, and the international community, especially as casualties mounted, villages emptied, and infrastructure suffered damage on both sides.

officials had launched full shuttle diplomacy to prevent the northern front from exploding into a second major theatre of war. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s internal political fragility with Hezbollah operating as both a political actor and an armed organization complicated negotiation positions. Israel’s shifting military posture and Iran’s regional influence added additional layers, making every escalation more dangerous.

All of these factors sustained cross-border violence, assassinations of high-ranking Hezbollah figures, intensifying speeches from leaders on both sides, and the risk of dragging multiple countries into a regional war pressured mediators to accelerate talks. By late 2024, this diplomatic push resulted in a ceasefire framework centered on UNIFIL monitoring, a strengthened Mechanism Committee, phased security steps, and a roadmap that aimed to prevent the conflict from spiraling further.

In late September 2024, Israeli forces carried out a large-scale airstrike on the southern suburbs of Beirut which ended by the death of “Hassan Nasrallah”, the

group's longtime leader. The killing of Hezbollah's leader has shaken the group's structure and yet, the group's deputy leader Naim Qassem publicly declared that Hezbollah would "never abandon our weapons". Rejecting calls for disarmament even as the Lebanese government is committed to the 'state monopoly on arms'

Bullet points of the agreement

1. Immediate cessation of offensive cross-border operations by both parties;
2. Phased Israeli redeployment and withdrawal from specified positions north of the Blue Line (monitoring required)
3. UNIFIL role & Mechanism Committee for incident recording, verification and diplomatic follow-up
4. Political commitment to the "state monopoly on arms" in Lebanon with staged LAF-led implementation modalities
5. Humanitarian access & reconstruction cooperation to repair conflict-damaged civilian infrastructure.

Nov- Dec 2024

Ceasefire activated and monitoring mechanisms established; UNIFIL resumed or altered field posture and the Mechanism Committee convened to set reporting lines.

Jan-Apr 2025

Relative calm compared to the previous war months; UNIFIL and the Mechanism refined incident reporting. Sporadic drone or targeted operations were reported but at lower frequency.

May- June 2025

Renewed kinetic activity: Targeted drone strikes and vehicle strikes attributed to Israeli operations increased in June; several incidents produced civilian and combatant casualties in Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil and surrounding areas. UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities recorded and protested some actions. (Local press + UNIFIL cited.)

July 2025

Diplomatic push & targeted strikes: U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and other interlocutors intensified diplomacy with a staged-disarmament proposal; strikes continued on suspected Hezbollah infrastructure across the south and Beqaa; Hezbollah reiterated refusal to disarm absent Israeli compliance.

Aug 2025

Lebanese cabinet decision: Lebanese cabinet approved objectives to pursue a state-monopoly-on-arms posture and tasked the LAF to prepare a roadmap (official announcements and reporting). UNSC Resolution 2790 (Aug 28, 2025) extended UNIFIL's mandate and called for timelines related to the force and Lebanese deployment in certain positions. France publicly welcomed the UNSC action.

Sep 2025

Sustained monitoring & diplomatic traffic: UNIFIL continued to report incidents, and regional diplomacy (including Iranian contacts) increased in frequency.

Oct 2025 – (selected high-impact incidents)

Oct 11: Heavy Israeli airstrikes in Musaylih/Ej Jarmaq and nearby southern towns; local reporting and Reuters coverage recorded powerful explosions and material damage.

Oct 12: Strike near UNIFIL patrols; UNIFIL reported injuries to personnel in incidents proximate to peacekeepers (UNIFIL statements).

Oct 26: UNIFIL reported a drone dropping a grenade near a patrol in Kfar Kila followed by tank fire; the UN labelled the action a “**blatant violation**” of Resolution 1701; the same period recorded Israeli strikes that killed at least three people in southern/eastern Lebanon.

Oct 30: An Israeli ground raid in Blida (Bint Jbeil district) struck a municipal building; a municipal worker was killed (AP/Reuters reporting); UNIFIL formally protested the incursion.

Nov 2025

The ceasefire continues as the de-facto framework preventing all-out war, but groups of recurring tactical incidents, political disputes over disarmament, and high-profile strikes have persisted. UN reports note civilian casualties and rising humanitarian needs.

Violations & Incidents Analysis

Air and drone strikes were the most frequent form of kinetic action, described by Israeli officials as precision actions against Hezbollah infrastructure and by Lebanese and UN sources as incidents often affecting populated outskirts.

Dangerous incidents near UNIFIL: Drone-delivered grenades and tank fire close to UN patrols, raised international alarms and produced formal UNIFIL protests. These incidents risk direct confrontation with peacekeepers.

Ground raids and incursions have greater escalation potential. the Oct 30 Blida raid (death reported) is an example that produced strong Lebanese and international reactions.

According to reports by UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, since the ceasefire more than 225 hidden Hezbollah weapons or ammunition caches have been discovered in southern Lebanon (south of the Litani, including near border areas).

A tragic example: on 9 August 2025, an explosion occurred in the village of Wadi Zibqin when the Lebanese Army was dismantling munitions at one such depot. The blast killed six soldiers and injured several others.

Attribution

Israeli authorities often frame incidents in terms of security, emphasizing that Hezbollah is the primary target of military actions across the border. Their statements typically focus on disrupting militant infrastructure, weapons storage, or launch sites, portraying operations as precise and limited to combatants. In contrast, Lebanese media outlets and local sources frequently report the broader human impact of these operations, highlighting civilian casualties, property damage, and disruption to daily life.

Geographic clustering

Southern Lebanon (Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Tyre) and parts of the Bekaa Valley are primary flashpoints. Operations were reported near or north of the Litani River in multiple instances, drawing UN attention.

Fortified position and buffer zone:

UNIFIL has publicly confirmed that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continues to hold five fortified positions inside southern Lebanon. plus so-called buffer zones where Lebanese civilians and security forces are barred. These are not simple outposts but heavily fortified sites, equipped with earth berms, bunkers, and heavy armour a pattern that contradicts the spirit and letter of the ceasefire agreement..

Because of that continued presence, the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) across south Lebanon, a core part of the plan to restore Lebanese sovereign control, remains incomplete. According to UNIFIL, while LAF has redeployed to many positions south of the Litani River since November 2024, those deployments are “blocked” or limited in areas under Israeli control.

On the military/security side, UNIFIL and LAF have tried to assert state authority: UNIFIL continues its patrols along the border, documenting violations and reporting them; meanwhile, the LAF has expanded its presence where possible, reestablishing checkpoints, clearing debris, and dealing with the aftermath of conflict, such as unexploded ordnance and weapons caches uncovered during inspections.

On the diplomatic level, the continued occupation has triggered public condemnation from both UN and Lebanese officials. The persistence of these positions is treated as a breach of the ceasefire terms and of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which prohibits Israeli re-occupation of Lebanese territory after hostilities.

Nevertheless, Israel’s political leadership has defended the occupation of the five points as necessary for “security of the northern border,” with official statements declaring that IDF troops will remain in those positions indefinitely.

Diplomacy – via UN statements, international monitoring mechanisms, and Lebanese government protests – continues to call for withdrawal, but the impasse remains unresolved.

Humanitarian & Social Effects

Civilian casualties & infrastructure

UN reporting aggregated over the year indicates dozens of civilian deaths and many more injuries attributable to strikes and cross-border incidents; the UN Human Rights Office highlighted extensive civilian harm and damage to schools, housing etc... The Guardian's aggregation noted at least 127 civilian deaths since the ceasefire began (reported Nov 25, 2025) in its synthesis of UN statements, illustrating the human cost of recurrent strikes.

Displacement & economic effect

Recurrent strikes and fear of escalation produced localised displacement (tens of thousands at different times according to UN/NGO reporting aggregated in press accounts), damaged agricultural livelihoods and delayed reconstruction (equipment and infrastructure destroyed in strikes). Humanitarian actors highlighted access constraints due to insecurity.

Diplomatic Engagements

U.S. special envoys – Tom Barrack engaged in shuttle diplomacy pressing Lebanon to produce a staged disarmament roadmap in return for security guarantees and reconstruction support; he emphasized the limited ability of the U.S. to compel Israeli tactical choices and urged Lebanese political action.

Mechanism Committee sessions (ongoing) – Regular meetings at Naqoura involving UNIFIL, Lebanese officials and international envoys to review incidents and follow up on verification. These sessions formed the principal operational structure for redress and reporting.

French diplomatic role – France sponsored the UNSC resolution renewing UNIFIL and repeatedly condemned attacks on peacekeepers, pressing for enforcement of 1701 and protection of civilians.

UNIFIL statements (Oct 26, 2025) – UNIFIL publicly condemned the drone-grenade drop near its patrol and called it a blatant violation; it filed formal protests after Blida. Such UN statements raised the diplomatic temperature and triggered further international comment.

Position of Lebanon

Lebanon publicly endorsed the state-monopoly-on-arms goal (cabinets statement in Aug 2025) and tasked the LAF to prepare a roadmap for staged consolidation. Lebanon conditioned progress on credible Israeli compliance (withdrawal and halting strikes). Domestic political fragmentation and Hezbollah's entrenched role constrained practical enforcement.

Position of Israel

Israel framed operations as targeted defensive measures aimed at degrading Hezbollah's offensive capabilities and preventing rearmament. Israeli officials emphasised that any withdrawal or reduction would be conditional on verifiable disarmament steps by Hezbollah and on clear security assurances for Israel's northern border. This conditionality complicated mutual confidence-building.

US, French, Qatari & UN Mediation

United States: Active shuttle diplomacy and supporters of staged disarmament linked to Israeli steps and international assistance.

France: Sponsor of UNSC action and vocal defender of UNIFIL and peacekeeper safety.

Qatar & Egypt: Regional facilitators operating through backchannels and mediating between Hezbollah-aligned parties and official mediators.

United Nations / UNIFIL / OHCHR: Monitoring, reporting and public condemnation of incidents endangering peacekeepers and civilians; UNSC renewal of UNIFIL's mandate in Aug 2025 (Resolution 2790) framed the international legal oversight posture.

Assessment After One Year

The ceasefire postponed a full-scale war on the Lebanon front and Created monitoring channels (UNIFIL, Mechanism Committee) that allowed structured incident recording and diplomatic engagement. **However**, the Persistent tactical violence (air strikes, drone incidents, raids) hasn't stopped, No verified disarmament: Hezbollah remains armed and politically committed to "resistance" as long as Israeli positions and strikes persist. And the Incidents near peacekeepers exposed monitoring and enforcement gaps, raising questions about longer-term oversight.

One year after the November 2024 ceasefire, the agreement is functioning over the papers only. Tactical violence persisted and political deadlock over disarmament prevented structural progress. Converting the ceasefire into a durable peace will require credible monitoring and enforcement, political resolve inside Lebanon to unify security authority under the state, verified security guarantees for Israel, and sustained international incentives (and pressure) to bridge the trust gap.