Iraq Special Report on the Parliamentary Elections
May 23, 2018
القانون 10 والمراسيم السابقة: أداة تغيير ديمغرافي واقتصادي بحجة إعادة الاعمار
June 2, 2018

Stability in the Midst of Chaos: Jordan’s Evolving Refugee Policies, 2012-2016

An aerial view shows the Zaatari refugee camp near the Jordanian city of Mafraq, some 8 kilometers from the Jordanian-Syrian border. 03/02/2016. BBC News

Immediately after its independence, Jordan received an influx of Palestinian refugees, soon followed by refugees from conflicts throughout Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Jordan is seen as a refugee haven and relies on the international aid community. This essay focuses on the contemporary refugee crisis in Jordan to best understand why Jordan has shifted its policies from continually warehousing refugees into camps to allowing local integration through a work permit program. Through analyzing government documents, international treaties, media reports, and academic articles, this article will highlight Jordan’s determinants in regard to its previous experiences with refugees, which mainly references the Palestinian and Iraqi refugee crises. The timeframe of June 2012 – June 2016 revolves around the Syrian influx, and Jordan has reacted differently to this group of refugees largely due to the international pressures that come with aid.

Refugees in Jordan

Jordan has long opened its doors to refugees, but few of them have left. A half of the country’s population is Palestinian, and surges of Iraqi refugees after the first Gulf war and the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq along with Syrian refugees since 2011 have lowered Jordan’s original population to twenty percent of the total residents.[1] With no end in sight to the Iraqi or Syrian conflicts, the creation of refugee camps is a policy attempt to try to manage the crisis more effectively, with a growing awareness that the refugees may be living in the camps for years to come. Both contexts have garnered an ineffective and minuscule international response towards ending Jordan’s crisis, ensuring that refugees will not return to a stable and peaceful Iraq or Syria anytime soon.

Syria’s civil war has led to the largest exodus of people from a single country in recorded history. Jordan is hosting 1.4 million of the 12 million displaced Syrians, of which only 650,000 are officially registered and 100,000 of those are living in camps. [2] The remaining 1.3 million refugees in Jordan live outside camps in some of the poorest areas of the country, and are classified as extremely vulnerable. [3] Jordan’s response to the crisis has been backed by national and international agencies, through the building of the three Syrian refugee camps, Zaatari, Mrajeeb Al-Fhood, and Azraq. However, there is a growing acknowledgment that current camp-based humanitarian funding and programming are neither sustainable nor sufficient, and should be complemented by a more development-oriented approach to build national resilience and sustain the level and quality of services provided.[4]

Refugees in International Relations

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Globally, one in every 122 humans is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum. If this were the population of a country, it would be the world’s 24th biggest.”[5] This quote represents over 59 million displaced people across the globe. Refugee movements are an inherent part of international politics as their consequences, causes, and responses are intertwined with state actions, as forced migration has an inextricable relationship with conflict.[6] Across many countries, newfound border tightening measures harm refugees’ ability to seek asylum, as they are forced into squalor and/or refugee camps. The UNHCR is the international organization dedicated to protecting refugees internationally and focuses on durable solutions to improve refugee situations. There are three main solutions towards refugee situations: temporary asylum (where countries are integrated into local areas), third-county resettlement (where refugees immigrate and acclimate to a new country), and voluntary repatriation (where refugees return to their country of origin).         

Temporary asylum is mainly practiced today as the administration of refugee camps in border countries to the main conflict. These camps are largely underfunded, which places a massive strain on the host government to provide the land and other resources for protection. Many refugees stay in camps of their neighboring countries without local integration for a decade or more before they get a chance to resettle in a third country. Many Syrian refugees live in urban areas without international protection because the UNHCR only provides assistance to official refugees following the Refugee Status Determination (RSD), and Jordan cannot provide refugees assistance without the help from the UNHCR. The RSD process helps the UNHCR understand which groups of people can be accurately labeled as refugees, and are entitled to protection under international refugee law. International governments and organizations have sparsely donated to this conflict, as they defer to the UNHCR and the host country to solve this crisis. The UNHCR conducts all RSD in Jordan because Jordan has not published a legal RSD framework. According to the UNHCR, this process should not take more than three months, but it often takes much longer, with little notification of when it will actually be completed and no means of self-support in the meantime.[7] Because those waiting on an RSD notification are not legally considered refugees, a state is not required to provide any services to them.

The UNHCR has championed repatriation as the main method to solve refugee migrations.[8] The underlying assumption of repatriation is that refugees will voluntarily return to their home countries once the violence that they fled from subsides.[9] This assumption is problematic because it overlooks the direct needs of the refugees as well as creates a policy where international organizations like the UNHCR can enforce repatriation due to the relatively safer home country conditions than before the refugees left, even if this means the overall violence has not ended.[10] Through continually championing repatriation, the UNHCR was able to normalize this solution to refugee crises.[11] This is especially the case for the Palestinians, as they have no country to return to and repatriation is seen as an idealistic goal for a future, but not a solution for the present. [12] Other specialized international organizations have seen a similar transferal of power from states; however, the UNHCR’s trifecta of factual, moral, and legal legitimacy has created the international norms of service provision with regard to its definition of refugees.

If there were more international motivation to resolve home country conflicts, then voluntary repatriation would be a stronger durable solution. If there were more funding for integrating refugees into local host country economies, then temporary asylum would be a stronger durable solution. Because neither of these scenarios reflects modern international politics, third-country resettlement must become a more dominant solution. However, states are not obliged to accept refugees for resettlement but rather voluntarily offer accommodation as a tangible expression of international solidarity. Third-country resettlement can only be achieved through collaboration with various resettlement states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs,) but resettlement must be a complement to, and not a substitute for, the provision of international protection for those that apply for asylum status.

Jordan’s Domestic Determinants

Jordan is in a precarious situation as it continues to accept refugees to gain more aid, even though Jordan lacks the resources to support a population of refugees nearly half of its own.[13] Largely due to its geographic location, Jordan has become dependent on external sources of revenue to support its lack of resources. It maintains its ties to the West – which provide a large amount of economic and military aid, through continually housing refugees and acting as an intermediary and ally in times of regional conflicts. Jordan has used their status as a perpetual refugee host to ensure the continual arrival of international aid, but now the scope of the Syrian refugee crisis has overwhelmed the country to the point with the aid flows are insufficient to handle the new crisis.

Throughout the conflicts since 1948, Jordan has maintained a policy of openness to those fleeing persecution. In tandem with this policy, Jordan possesses a great deal of soft power in the Middle East. It has served as a mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict on several occasions, and it has successfully maintained the respect of its neighbors, even as turbulent times have risen elsewhere in the region. However, this soft power means it must cooperate with the international community to maintain its economic and political stability. Jordan’s main and overarching policy is stability and security, and those concepts overshadow every other foreign policy goal. [14] The resiliency of Jordan to overcome economic, militaristic, and security concerns is surprising given the chaotic situation in its neighboring countries. Jordan’s continual stability is shown through its diplomatic prowess to maintain friends on both sides of the aisle.

UNRWA and the Right to Return

            Jordan has deferred most Palestinian refugee policy and aid provision to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides services and maintaining camps. This deferral shows the importance of the enlargement of the agency’s role in Jordanian politics. [15] The UNRWA took over the services to provide for the Palestinians, and since the UNRWA does not have enough resources, it has made an international preference towards repatriation. The demand of the Palestinians is to be allowed to return to their homeland, the pre-1948 border. [16] Palestinians are stateless and deemed unable to repatriate, as they have no internationally recognized country to return to.[17] The UNRWA functions as a political advocate for Palestinian rights, especially the right to return.[18] The UNRWA’s advocacy for the right to return has internationalized the desire of the Palestinians, taking the political burden off Jordan. [19] Although the idea has moved to the international sphere, no direct policies from Israel or Jordan have changed, so repatriation still serves as the utopian ideal. For the foreseeable future, the UNRWA will continue to be a service provider for the Palestinians refugees while Jordan maintains its host status.

The Culture of Fear

            Jordan has historically been the most receptive country toward Palestinian refugees; having granted automatic citizenship to Palestinian refugees on its territory at the time it claimed sovereignty over the West Bank.[20] New influxes from Iraq, Syria, and other countries however, have put Jordan’s historical tolerance toward refugees under severe strain. The size of the resource envelope is always constrained, but during refugee events it is further tightened due to the politicization of fear. Local integration of new refugee influxes scares Jordanian officials for the fear of a repeat of the Palestinian situation from years before. Although it is able to incorporate new Syrian refugees due to its status as refugee haven for refugees of forty-five nationalities, Jordan was unprepared for the vast numbers of Syrians, as today’s unofficial numbers place them at 1.4 million.[21] To attempt to solve the situation, refugee camps were built. Refugee camps are unsustainable quasi-solutions but attract international donors because their aid impact is more readily seen. They are unsustainable because they do not allow refugees to become self-reliant, and their continual dependence on services from the camp will exacerbate the conflict, as they do not gain transferable skills to help rebuild their home societies or third country resettlement whenever they are able to return.

            Another major fear is Jordan’s border security as violence increases in each of its neighbors. The most prominent of these acts of violence is the rise of Daesh, originally founded as Al-Qaeda in Iraq by a Palestinian refugee who had lived in Jordan, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.[22] Al-Zarqawi’s radicalization in Jordan began with a life of crime, and he serves as an example of the destabilizing risks of marginalization and radicalization, which has led to more refugee flows. The fear of radicalization permeates throughout the Middle East and at its epicenter; Jordan has maintained a stable hold on its power in order to ensure that another vacuum for violence does not open up. However, the specific conditions in which Al-Zarqawi was radicalized are an unintended consequence of Jordan’s strict policies. Al-Zarqawi represents the potential outcome for radicalization of refugees living in squalor and without any form of assistance and further suggests that Jordan must place an emphasis on new, less marginalizing policies in order to break the cycle.

The International Analysis – The Politics of Aid

            Over the past fifty years, support for aid has waxed and waned. But what has particularly characterized the post-war foreign aid enterprise has been its durability.[23] The political dimensions of aid remain central to understanding both the giving of aid and its impact at the recipient end. The growing recognition that the impact and effectiveness of aid is crucially dependent upon the political structures and processes of the country to which it is given.[24] In general, agencies, especially the UNHCR and UNRWA, have much leeway in deciding when, where, and how aid goes to different crises globally. In terms of refugee events, aid is found to be particularly volatile as most refugee-asylum countries are aid-dependent.[25]

Humanitarian aid has the power to spread political norms, especially considering the securitization of refugee crises. The overall price tag for the host country is usually much higher than the financial number; creating policies, implementing new activities, and other political decisions may come as outcomes from an aid transaction. This aid, “creates the possibility that the political rationality of humanitarian refugee management its particular knowledge and techniques of power, which may permanently influence the political contexts of its areas of operations.”[26] A specific technique of power that the UNHCR employs is how it conducts humanitarian refugee management, through the labeling of crises as emergencies and the distribution of resources. These humanitarian agencies categorize refugee situations through a sovereign state lens, contributing to

the construction of refugees as political outcast, which justifies and explains their warehousing in camps and marking as exceptional, problematic beings. Humanitarian rhetoric and programming is central to the diffusion of a particular understanding of what the identity of ‘refugee’ contains and means; specifically that refugees are desperate ‘bare lives’ requiring humanitarian intervention in order to be rectified into a sovereign situation. Rather than transporting a form of politics that pathologises forced migration, humanitarian agencies should instead tread carefully in local political contexts and use their resources to support existing, benign forms of integration where they exist. [27]

The close cooperation between UNHCR, international NGOs, and local partners, diffuse local politics into the international environment, especially through the process of aid. International aid causes a cycle of dependence towards its recipients, and the current distribution method of constantly doling out aid is unsustainable and the root of the developmental problems for least-developed countries. [28] This cyclical nature of aid has created a dependence, to which Jordan has succumbed, due to its lack of resources. This refugee crisis has fostered in project-oriented humanitarian aid, a necessity for Jordan to continually be a refugee host country.

 

Syrian Refugees in Jordan, 2012 – 2016

This four-year window serves as a look into the most contemporary aspects of the Jordanian refugee crisis. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the Syrian Civil War, the rise of Daesh, and other regional events have contributed to the influx of millions of refugees. The magnitude of the regional violence has forced Jordan to alter its policy trajectory as a result of the international pressures. This shift is immensely significant for Jordan as it shows the political consensus to reframe refugees as viable and hopeful to the economy, not just extensions of the conflict they are fleeing.[29] Its original strategy of continuity – warehousing refugees in camps and keep them separate from society – has been unsustainable, thus international pressures led to collaborative documents from the Jordanian government – National Resilience Plan, Jordan Response Plan, Jordan 2025, and the Jordan Compact. Jordan’s original policy of continuity through refugee camps overwhelmed Jordan as the Syrian crisis grew. These documents create an actionable plan for the government to take, in accordance with international partners, allowing for unprecedented loans and aid to support these plans[30].

Jordan’s response to the crisis has been backed by national and international agencies, through the building of the three camps, (Zaatari, Mrajeeb Al-Fhood, and Azraq), but there is a growing acknowledgment that current life-saving humanitarian funding and programming are neither sustainable nor sufficient, and should be complemented by a more development-oriented approach to build national resilience and sustain the level and quality of services provided.[31] Syrians are overwhelming the Jordanian infrastructure as they relentlessly flee into Jordan in large quantities.[32] The popular attitude in Jordan is a sense of duty to protect since Syrians havenowhere else to go, but there is a simultaneous feeling of resentment for carrying the burden of protection alone. Jordan’s position in a turbulent region has earmarked the country as a sanctuary for those fleeing violence.[33]  

Refugee Camps and UNHCR Assistance

            Due to the number of displaced people entering its borders, Jordan constructed the Zaatari refugee camp in July 2012 in the hope that it would be able to hold up to 100,000 people in the future.[34] Zaatari was Jordan’s first direct response to the Syrian refugees, providing the land, water, and electricity for the entire camp. Within a year of opening, Zaatari became Jordan’s fourth largest city.[35] Zaatari is currently over capacity and is straining Jordan’s resources, especially water.[36] Water scarcity is a prominent problem in the Middle East, and its urgency in Jordan has increased with the influx of thousands of refugees. International organizations currently lack the funding to continue supporting the camps, which heightens tensions in Jordan.

The need for temporary housing of Syrian refugees has forced Jordan to plead for an increase in international aid. In April 2013, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates partnered to support a new refugee camp near Zaatari. The UK and UAE run Mrajeeb Al-Fhood to support education of Syrian youth and implement stronger health services.[37] Zaatari and Mrajeeb Al-Fhood present two different living styles for the Syrian refugees. While Zaatari continues to expand and serve as a humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis, with temporary housing for many individuals, aid workers in Mrajeeb Al-Fhood have dubbed it a “five-star camp” due to its ample electricity, running water, and roofed lodging for its roughly 3,400 residents, a fraction of the 80,000 plus living in Zaatari.[38] Mrajeeb Al-Fhood primarily allows refugee families entrance, a sharp contrast to the individuals fleeing the Syrian civil war who stay in Zaatari. Mrajeeb Al-Fhood is not expanding fast enough to accommodate the growing number of Syrian refugees.[39]

As Zaatari took in thousands of refugees since its opening, Jordan and the UNHCR were collaborating to build yet another refugee camp, Azraq, which opened in April 2014 and surpasses the size, scope, and organization of Zaatari.[40] Azraq was carefully designed with Zaatari’s flaws in mind, such as a lack of sturdy shelters, effective security, and sense of community.[41] The shelters in Azraq are stronger structures that were built to better cope with the high winds and extreme desert temperatures; a police station has been built on-site to help keep the camp secure, and efforts have been made to foster a sense of community by grouping Syrians in six villages by their town or region of origin.[42]

Although Azraq has the capacity to house up to 130,000 refugees, it is nearly empty, with a population of only around 18,500 since its opening in April 2014.[43] Residents say scalding summer temperatures, a lack of electricity and soaring food prices have created harsh conditions inside the desert camp.[44] For both Azraq and Zaatari, the UNHCR cannot continue to deliver humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees due to the continual underfunding of the camps by the international community.[45] The two camps are underfunded to the point where basic services are not being provided, especially food assistance, creating unrest among the refugees.[46] The UNHCR and Jordan are facing huge economic burdens, which exacerbate this refugee crisis.

Of the 650,000 officially documented Syrians in Jordan, 80 percent of them are living in urban areas and not in the Zaatari, Mrajeeb Al-Fhood, or Azraq camps, which means that 520,000 refugees are not receiving any formal assistance from the UNHCR.[47] The abject poverty line in Jordan is at less than $40 per person per month in each family, and two thirds of refugees in Jordan live below this line.[48] This inadequate international response to the refugee crisis has significantly tightened the amount of resources available for both Jordan’s refugees, which includes over 650,000 Syrians, and Jordanian citizens. Both of these contexts relied on the UNHCR for funding and refugee expertise. Financial difficulties have led to cuts in the agency’s emergency fund and have seriously affected its ability to mobilize resources for unanticipated humanitarian emergencies. Further, Jordan was not fully prepared for the continual influx, straining its resources to the breaking point.

 

Selectively Open Door Policy

Jordan initially decided to heavily monitor its border with Syria in an attempt to reduce the number of refugees flooding through its borders. Jordan claims to have a relatively open border policy; however, its authority in allowing displaced persons to enter is its own decision.[49] Human rights NGOs add to the pressure to Jordan through shedding list on issues, as both partners and critics of the government. NGOs and media reports have called into question the “openness” of Jordan’s open door policy. [50] They have expressed concern over the closing of informal entry points along the Syria-Jordan border. [51] Although the official statement from Jordan maintains an open door policy, its practice shows that the door is half-open. Jordan’s state capacity to accommodate Syria’s refugees has weakened with the continual influx, so the government is abandoning newer arrivals in remote border areas for weeks without effective protection and regular access to aid.[52] International organizations report that in July 2014, the Jordanian military prevented Syrians from entering through the border crossing, forcing them to remain on a raised barrier of sand, or berm, which marks the Jordanian limit of a border zone between Syria and Jordan.[53] Many Syrians are stuck between the two countries, unsheltered and without humanitarian aid. Satellite images of the berm area show that the refugees have built hundreds of informal tent structures on the northern side of the berm, which likely indicates the presence of hundreds of Syrians stranded outside of Jordan.[54]

 

Governmental Plans: NRP, JRP, and Jordan 2025

In early 2014, Jordan’s government collaborated with the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to draft the National Resilience Plan (NRP), a document creating the Jordan’s actionable refugee policy Jordan

has shared significantly in bearing the brunt of the crisis and in shouldering its burden on behalf of the international community. From a humanitarian perspective, and in recognition of the human tragedy unfolding within Syria, the Government has maintained an open border policy to Syrians seeking refuge, protection, and safety from the conflict. Within that same humanitarian spirit the government and the people of Jordan have extended public services, facilities, resources and hospitality in an attempt to accommodate the most pressing needs of the Syrian refugee population now in its midst.[55]

This plan includes a request to use $4.295 billion United States dollars in Jordan to support the implementation of priority projects in the education, health, energy, municipalities, water, housing and security sectors.[56] This is the first shift in Jordan’s refugee policy as it allows for international cooperation to handle the crisis. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) continues the planning as it extends into 2018 and updates the situation in Jordan.[57] The Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation authored both the NRP and JRP, demonstrating the commitment of the government to create effective plans to respond to the crisis. In tandem with these collaborative plans, the Prime Minister of Jordan created a vision for Jordan’s economic and social goals to achieve by the year 2025, aptly titled Jordan 2025.[58] These documents highlight the extent the Jordanian government is actively pursuing international help.

 

The Shift in Refugee Policy, Work Permits and Local Integration

The most observable policy innovation within the four-year window is the creation of the Jordan Compact that allowed for the creation of work permits. In February of 2016, London hosted a conference entitled, Supporting Syria and the Region, where the Jordan Compact was officially adopted.[59] This international setting prompted Jordan to reverse its policies in cooperation with international partners. As a result of this conference, Jordan began to assist a select number of Syrian refugees through allowing them to obtain work permits. Due to a new partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank, which will provide a large loan to finance the work permit program, Jordan is able to institute this integration policy for Syrian refugees.[60]

At the end of March 2016, the President of the World Bank, along with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, officially announced that it would be financing the creation of 100,000 new jobs in Jordan through special economic zones.[61] This new partnership of $300 million dollars for year one will provide refugees the opportunity to work while expanding Jordan’s economy. This unprecedented loan from the World Bank demonstrates an international commitment to solve refugee crises, as it has created the Concessional Financing Facility (CFF) to allow countries affected by refugee crises to borrow at below regular rates to respond quickly to the situation.[62] This loan is highly unusual because of it provides concessionary funding to Jordan at the International Development Association (IDA) rate. IDA is the funding wing of the World Bank that aims at providing very low interest loans to reduce poverty in the world’s poorest countries.[63] As a middle-income country, Jordan does not normally fall into this category for aid and instead it receives International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) funding. For the first year of this program, the World Bank will give Jordan a $300 million loan to help assist Jordan 2025 as well as the work permit program, $100 million of that initial loan will be allocated as an IDA credit, which is interest free[64].

Before this announcement of the loan, Syrians worked illegally and accepted lower wages, harsher working conditions, and other insecure and unstable means of economic support.[65] Legally employed Syrians will still in some cases work for lower wages, but have the chance to become self-reliant while not fearing being exposed for illegal work. Further, providing this employment for Syrian refugees heavily reduces reliance on the humanitarian sector and international community.[66] Allowing more Syrians to work leads to fewer illegal migrant workers, less dependence on financial assistance, and less strain on resources. Larger infrastructural, agricultural, and technological ventures will provide the job opportunities for the refugees.[67] The Jordanian government’s long-held view of the burden of refugees reflected the incorrect assumption that every refugee job means one less Jordanian job.[68] The high rates of domestic unemployment convinced Jordan to not allow Syrians to legally work.[69]

However, a 2014 report from the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) at the University of Oxford entitled Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions dispels some myths that the Jordanian government believed by barring refugees from working within its cities. The five myths are:

  1. Refugees are economically isolated;
  2. That they are a burden on host states;
  3. That they are economically homogenous;
  4. That they are technologically illiterate;
  5. That they are dependent on humanitarian assistance.[70]

This study disproves all five of these myths through focusing on African refugees in Kampala, Uganda. Although the case study focuses on refugees in Uganda, it represents a relatively positive case and highlights how a government can and should take measures to allow refugees the right to work and a significant degree of freedom of movement.[71] The continual humanitarian crisis has persuaded the Jordanian government to change its idea on local integration in tandem with international organizations.

As proven in the Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions report, these benefits from refugee employment are not utopian; rather they make the most of a bad situation enhancing the host country’s economy, educating the refugees, providing them a livelihood, and mitigating the chances of radicalization.[72] Uganda has a different set of circumstances than Jordan, so more information and diligently tracking the progress of this initiative is important. Official recognition from the Jordanian government that work permits may lead to economic growth has shifted the overwhelming burden that it has in regards to providing for refugees, and also dispels its notion that local integration will eventually mean citizenship. Syrian refugees will not become Jordanians, as did the Palestinians of the past, but will help enhance Jordan’s economy while gaining valuable skills they are able to transfer to rebuilding their homes when they can repatriate back to Syria. These work permits present a hopeful sign in a direct change of Jordanian policy attitudes towards refugees; however, they are not the final solution to this crisis. [73]  

Implications and Recommendations

Given that the dominant migrant groups in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan emerge from the neighboring states of Iraq, Israel/Palestine, and Syria, all of which are engaged in ongoing conflicts, the influx of migrants lends the issue an urgency that could be quelled only by a conclusion to the regional tensions.[74] Jordan must continue to shift its response from immediate humanitarian relief to long-term development, and from building camps to supporting cities. [75] This policy switch demands negotiation between the UNHCR, NGOs, and Jordan’s government, but as a host to 650,000 registered Syrian refugees and about two million others, Jordan does not have any alternative.[76] Its domestic determinants initially provided the basis for its camp-centered policy, but as that was unsustainable, its collaboration internationally highlights the influence that aid has to change policy.

Because Jordan is resource-dry and in desperate need of aid even without a refugee crisis, it must make calculated decisions based on the amount of international aid it receives. Jordan’s pattern of aid dependence is premised on its refugee management, and it must reframe its aid acceptance to ensure that the refugees it hosts are not continually marginalized. Aid must be envisioned towards tactics of integration, not towards refugee camps. The main reason it took until March 2016 to formally accept the idea of work permits is due to Jordan’s experiences with refugees. The determinants of Jordan’s current refugee policies revolve around its extensive experiences, which prevented Jordan from making timely decisions with refugees, especially around integration. The Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions report came out June 2014 and talks began a year later between Jordan and the World Bank. A preliminary assessment of this program’s impact shows some hopeful signs for integration.[77] However, a more comprehensive look at this policy will expose the specific successes and weaknesses of the program. The next recommendation is to invite the RSC from the University of Oxford to make a Jordan-specific report as a sequel to the original Uganda report. This next report will give high emphasis to the change over time in Jordan’s economic growth, and through careful monitoring of its economy will hopefully show the positive impact of local integration and work permits.

Lastly, the final recommendation is to expand access to work permits incrementally along with the results from the report. The long-term benefits, not only for Jordan’s economy but also for the home countries when repatriation is safe to happen, can outweigh the current costs. Having work permits reduces the need for international aid for the refugees as they will become more self-reliant, so this funding can be shifted into investment in Jordan’s economy, more psychosocial development activities as well as vocational trainings, and job creation. This work permit program shows the significant international dimension to the policy change. Refugee camps do not allow refugees the chance to gain these skills, so the long-term effect of work permits transfer out of Jordan as well. This will be a gradual process as there is an absorption limit of workers into the local economy as well as the consensus-building process among Jordanian officials. The beginning signs of the work permit program shows sign of potential success, however the process of expanding state capacity and gathering accurate data is an incremental path.

From July 2012 to February 2016, Jordan only took one actionable policy in response to its crises: the building of the three refugee camps, effectively ignoring the 1.4 million Syrian refugees living and working illegally in its major cities. Before the policy switch, the Jordanian government believed one Syrian refugee job was one fewer local Jordanian one, which accounted for its hesitancy in making a change. However, these refugees with permits will be able to become more self-reliant, easing the burden on the Jordanian government and international donor organizations to continue to fund livelihoods for refugees. There are well-established and longstanding reasons Jordan has a culture of fear towards refugee radicalization and overcrowding, but through trying not to repeat history, Jordan has committed new mistakes. However, Jordan has been compelled to respond with the work permit innovation. If too little too late, there is nevertheless a glimmer for hope for the future of the refugee communities as a result of the Jordan Compact, World Bank loan, and international pressures to influence Jordan’s decision.

Infrastructural changes are crucial for any country’s development, especially countries with overpopulation problems. At the current rate, Jordan’s infrastructure, crippled by unemployment of Jordan’s citizens as well as its large refugee population and beset by water and fuel shortages, is incapable of supporting so many long-term visitors while still servicing its own population. Allowing refugees to work on infrastructure projects throughout Jordan will reduce the huge burden Jordan has in hosting, as well as provide refugees the transferable skill of building and rebuilding physical infrastructure. International investment in employment schemes allowing refugees and Jordanians to work on infrastructural projects will provide many positive externalities towards Jordan’s own development as well as refugees’ skill-base.

Like the Palestinian refugee community before them, the Syrian refugee community is able to work and provide a life for themselves while living in Jordan, a more sustainable solution to refugee crises. However, unlike the Palestinians, these Syrians will be expected to return to Syria and will not become Jordanian citizens. In the time that they are in Jordan, the skills and education they receive will be invaluable in rebuilding post-conflict Syria, and when that day comes, the refugees will leave Jordan, having improved both themselves and their host country.

Bibliography

Abuqudairi, A. (2014). Jordan’s Invisible Refugees Suffer in Silence. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/jordans-invisible-refugees-suffer-silence-2014619131422115902.html

Akram, S.M. (2002). Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution. Journal of Palestine Studies 31(3), 36–51.

Al Husseini, J. (2010). UNRWA and the Refugees: A Difficult but Lasting Marriage. Journal of Palestine Studies 40(1), 6–26.

Aly, H. (2013). Policy or happenstance? Jordan’s dwindling Syrian refugee arrivals. IRINnews. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98195/policy-or-happenstance-jordan-s-dwindling-syrian-refugee-arrivals

Azoulay, A. (2014). Palestine as Symptom, Palestine as Hope: Revising Human Rights Discourse. Critical Inquiry 40(4), 332–364.

Baer, M. (2015). The Palestinian People: Ambiguities of Citizenship, in: The Human Right to Citizenship, A Slippery Concept. University of Pennsylvania Press. 45–61.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 1st edition. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.

Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J., and Omata, N. (2014). Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

Betts, A. and Loescher, G. (editors) (2010). Refugees in International Relations, 1st edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

bin Talal, P.E.H. (2016). 60 Million Refugees: A Crisis That Has Outgrown Its 65-Year-Old Solution. WANA Institute. http://wanainstitute.org/en/blog/60-million-refugees-crisis-has-outgrown-its-65-year-old-solution

Bruere, W. (2012). Education of water rationing for Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNICEF. http://www.unicef.org/wash/jordan_65506.html

Bulíř, A. and Hamann, A.J. (2003). Aid Volatility: An Empirical Assessment. IMF Staff Papers 50(1), 64–89.

Cormaic, R.M. (2015). Remote camp awaits Syrian refugees who may not come. The Irish Times. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/remote-camp-awaits-syrian-refugees-who-may-not-come-1.2389022

Doucet, L. (2012). Jordan’s desert camp for Syrian refugees. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19042686

Duncan, A. (2013). New UK and UAE partnership for Syrian refugee camp. GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-and-uae-partnership-for-syrian-refugee-camp

Dunmore, C. (2016). Work permit boost gives hope to Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/4/57162b0a6/work-permit-boost-gives-hope-syrian-refugees-jordan.html

El Khalil, Z. (2016). Concessional Financing Facility Funds Projects to Support Refugees and Host Communities Impacted by the Syrian Crisis. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/07/28/concessional-financing-facility-funds-projects-to-support-refugees

ElWir, T. (2016). The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis. London Conference.

Ensour, A. (2015). Jordan 2025. Prime Ministerial Team, Amman, Jordan.

Fakhoury, I. (2015). Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, Jordan.

Gandolfo, K.L. (2007). Bridging the Economic Gap: The Rise and Fall of the Middle Class in Jordan. The Arab Studies Journal 15/16(2/1), 100–122.

Greening, J. (2016). Supporting  Syria and the Region. Department for International Development, London, United Kingdom.

Ghanem, H. Tsitsiragos, D., and Finkelston, K. (2016). Country Partnership Framework for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Period of FY17-FY22 (No. 102746-JO). World Bank Group.

Hoffmann, S. (2015). A Sovereign for All: The Management of Refugees as Nation-State Politics, in: De Lauri, A.D. (editor), The Politics of Humanitarianism: Power, Ideology and Aid. I.B.Tauris, 147–174.

Hoke, Z. (2013). Jordan Struggles With Syrian Refugee Crisis. VOA. http://www.voanews.com/content/syrian-refugees-hope-to-return-but-life-abroad-continues/1757463.html

Isotalo, R. (2009). Politicizing the Transnational: On Implications for Migrants, Refugees, and Scholarship. Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 53(3), 60–84.

Jaabari, R. (2014). Jordan struggles to manage Syrian refugee crisis – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East. Al-Monitor. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/jordan-syria-refugees-safe-shelter-tensions.html

Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert (2015). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/03/jordan-syrians-blocked-stranded-desert

Kanaana, S. (2015). Informally employed Syrian refugees, working under harsh conditions, further strain Jordanian labour market. ILO. http://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_369592/lang–en/index.htm

Karadsheh, J. (2015). The other side of Jordan’s refugee crisis. CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/22/middleeast/jordan-amman-refugees-other-side/index.html

Knell, Y. (2014). Azraq: How a refugee camp is built from scratch. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27205291

Laub, K. and Malkawi, K. (2016). Jordan Tests Ground for Syria Refugee Jobs Program. NBC New York. http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/Jordan-Test-Ground-for-Large-Jobs-Program-for-Syria-Refugees–371031331.html

Loizides, N.G. and Antoniades, M.A. (2009). Negotiating the Right of Return. Journal of Peace Research 46(5), 611–622.

Marks, J. (2016). Mitigating the Impact of Forced Migration on Syrians. USMEYN. https://www.usmeyouthnetwork.org/2016/05/mitigating-the-impact-of-forced-migration-on-syrians/

Mednick, S. (2016). A push for education and livelihoods for refugees in Jordan. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/a-push-for-education-and-livelihoods-for-refugees-in-jordan-88006

Moyo, D. (2010). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, 1st edition. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Ramsi, A. (2013). A tale of two refugee cities. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201391695641836372.html

Reznick, A. (2015). Jordan’s Azraq Syrian refugee camp stands largely empty. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/05/jordan-azraq-syrian-refugee-camp-stands-largely-empty-150526084850543.html

Riddell, R.C. (2007). Does Foreign Aid Really Work? OUP Oxford: Oxford, UK.

Rummery, A. (2016). Access to jobs improving for Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2016/4/5715ef866/access-jobs-improving-syrian-refugees-jordan.html

Ryan, C.R. (2002). Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah. Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colorado.

Ryseck, L. and Johannsen, M. (2009). UNRWA: Challenges for Humanitarian Aid in an Increasingly Sensitive Political Environment. Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 27(4), 260–265.

Saif, I. (2014). National Resilience Plan 2014-2016. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, Jordan.

Seeley, N. (2012). Jordan’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/01/jordans-open-door-policy-for-syrian-refugees/

Seeley, N. (2014). “We’ll Probably Get Through This Year”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/16/well-probably-get-through-this-year/

Su, A. (2014). A nation of refugees: Jordan struggles with those fleeing regional crises. Al Jazeera. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/25/jordan-refugees-iraq.html

Sweis, R.F. (2014). Jordan’s Open Door Is Now Only Cracked, Leaving Syrians Stranded. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/jordans-open-door-is-now-only-cracked-leaving-syrians-stranded.html

Syrian Refugees – A Snapshot of the Crisis: In Jordan (2015). Migration Policy Centre. http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=87

Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers (2015). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/

Tal, L. (1993). Is Jordan Doomed? Foreign Affairs 45–58.

UNHCR study shows rapid deterioration in living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan. (2015) UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/54b635b49.html

Universal Periodic Review: Jordan (2013). UNHCR. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/513d90172.pdf

Warrick, J. (2016). Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, 1st edition. Anchor, New York.

Weston, P. (2015). Inside Zaatari refugee camp: the fourth largest city in Jordan. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-the-largest-Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html

What Is IDA? (2015). World Bank. https://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-ida

Whitman, E. (2013). Jordan’s Invisible Refugee Crisis. The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/article/jordans-invisible-refugee-crisis/

Williams, S. (2014). As refugees are turned away, Jordan reaches its humanitarian limits. Middle East Eye http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/refugees-are-turned-away-jordan-reaches-its-humanitarian-limits-402998632

Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase (2015). UNHCR, Geneva. http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html

Ziade, M. (2016). World Bank approves US$100 million in financing to create 100,000 jobs for Jordanians, Syrian refugees. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/03/27/exceptional-financing-jordan-jobs-syrian-refugees

Zimmermann, S. (2012). Understanding repatriation: refugee perspectives on the importance of safety, reintegration, and hope. Population Space Place 18(1), 45–57.

[1] Williams, S. (2014). As refugees are turned away, Jordan reaches its humanitarian limits. Middle East Eye http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/refugees-are-turned-away-jordan-reaches-its-humanitarian-limits-402998632

[2] Hoke, Z. (2013). Jordan Struggles With Syrian Refugee Crisis. VOA. http://www.voanews.com/content/syrian-refugees-hope-to-return-but-life-abroad-continues/1757463.html

[3] Fakhoury, I. (2015). Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, Jordan.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase (2015). UNHCR, Geneva. http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html

[6] Betts, A. and Loescher, G. (editors) (2010). Refugees in International Relations, 1st edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

[7] Su, A. (2014). A nation of refugees: Jordan struggles with those fleeing regional crises. Al Jazeera. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/25/jordan-refugees-iraq.html

[8] Hoffmann, S. (2015). A Sovereign for All: The Management of Refugees as Nation-State Politics, in: De Lauri, A.D. (editor), The Politics of Humanitarianism: Power, Ideology and Aid. I.B.Tauris, 147–174.

[9] Zimmermann, S. (2012). Understanding repatriation: refugee perspectives on the importance of safety, reintegration, and hope. Population Space Place 18(1), 45–57.

[10] Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 1st edition. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.

[11] Ibid, 100.

[12] Loizides, N.G. and Antoniades, M.A. (2009). Negotiating the Right of Return. Journal of Peace Research 46(5), 611–622.

[13] Tal, L. (1993). Is Jordan Doomed? Foreign Affairs 45–58.

[14] Ryan, C.R. (2002). Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah. Lynne Rienner Pub, Boulder, Colorado.

[15] Azoulay, A. (2014). Palestine as Symptom, Palestine as Hope: Revising Human Rights Discourse. Critical Inquiry 40(4), 332–364.

[16] Al Husseini, J. (2010). UNRWA and the Refugees: A Difficult but Lasting Marriage. Journal of Palestine Studies 40(1), 6–26.

[17] Baer, M. (2015). The Palestinian People: Ambiguities of Citizenship, in: The Human Right to Citizenship, A Slippery Concept. University of Pennsylvania Press. 45–61.

[18] Ryseck, L. and Johannsen, M. (2009). UNRWA: Challenges for Humanitarian Aid in an Increasingly Sensitive Political Environment. Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace 27(4), 260–265.

[19] Akram, S.M. (2002). Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution. Journal of Palestine Studies 31(3), 36–51.

[20] According to the Jordanian nationality law of the year 1954, “Any person with previous Palestinian nationality… before the date of May 14, 1948 residing in the Kingdom during the period from December 20, 1949 and February 16, 1954 is a Jordanian citizen.” Jordan’s Department of Palestinian Affairs http://www.dpa.gov.jo/

[21] Abuqudairi, A. (2014). Jordan’s Invisible Refugees Suffer in Silence. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/jordans-invisible-refugees-suffer-silence-2014619131422115902.html

[22] Warrick, J. (2016). Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, 1st edition. Anchor, New York, 15.

[23] Riddell, R.C. (2007). Does Foreign Aid Really Work? OUP Oxford: Oxford, UK.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Bulíř, A. and Hamann, A.J. (2003). Aid Volatility: An Empirical Assessment. IMF Staff Papers 50(1), 64–89.

[26] Hoffmann, S. (2015). A Sovereign for All: The Management of Refugees as Nation-State Politics, 155.

[27] Ibid, 172.

[28] Moyo, D. (2010). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, 1st edition. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

[29] Isotalo, R. (2009). Politicizing the Transnational: On Implications for Migrants, Refugees, and Scholarship. Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 53(3), 60–84.

[30] ElWir, T. (2016). The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis. London Conference.

[31] Isotalo, R. (2009). Politicizing the Transnational: On Implications for Migrants, Refugees, and Scholarship..

[32] Whitman, E. (2013). Jordan’s Invisible Refugee Crisis. The Nation. http://www.thenation.com/article/jordans-invisible-refugee-crisis/

[33] Karadsheh, J. (2015). The other side of Jordan’s refugee crisis. CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/22/middleeast/jordan-amman-refugees-other-side/index.html

[34] Doucet, L. (2012). Jordan’s desert camp for Syrian refugees. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19042686

[35] Weston, P. (2015). Inside Zaatari refugee camp: the fourth largest city in Jordan. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-the-largest-Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html

[36] Bruere, W. (2012). Education of water rationing for Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNICEF. http://www.unicef.org/wash/jordan_65506.html

[37] Duncan, A. (2013). New UK and UAE partnership for Syrian refugee camp. GOV.UK https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-and-uae-partnership-for-syrian-refugee-camp

[38] Ramsi, A. (2013). A tale of two refugee cities. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201391695641836372.html

[39] Ibid.

[40] Knell, Y. (2014). Azraq: How a refugee camp is built from scratch. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27205291

[41] Cormaic, R.M. (2015). Remote camp awaits Syrian refugees who may not come. The Irish Times. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/remote-camp-awaits-syrian-refugees-who-may-not-come-1.2389022

[42] Ibid.

[43] Reznick, A. (2015). Jordan’s Azraq Syrian refugee camp stands largely empty. Al Jazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/05/jordan-azraq-syrian-refugee-camp-stands-largely-empty-150526084850543.html

[44] Ibid.

[45] Seeley, N. (2014). “We’ll Probably Get Through This Year”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/16/well-probably-get-through-this-year/

[46] Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers (2015). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/

[47] Syrian Refugees – A Snapshot of the Crisis: In Jordan (2015). Migration Policy Centre. http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=87

[48] UNHCR study shows rapid deterioration in living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan. (2015) UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/54b635b49.html

[49] Sweis, R.F. (2014). Jordan’s Open Door Is Now Only Cracked, Leaving Syrians Stranded. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/jordans-open-door-is-now-only-cracked-leaving-syrians-stranded.html

[50] Seeley, N. (2012). Jordan’s “open door” policy for Syrian refugees. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/01/jordans-open-door-policy-for-syrian-refugees/

[51] Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert (2015). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/03/jordan-syrians-blocked-stranded-desert

[52] Aly, H. (2013). Policy or happenstance? Jordan’s dwindling Syrian refugee arrivals. IRINnews. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98195/policy-or-happenstance-jordan-s-dwindling-syrian-refugee-arrivals

[53] Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert (2015). Human Rights Watch.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Saif, I. (2014). National Resilience Plan 2014-2016. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, Jordan.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Fakhoury, I. (2015). Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016-2018.

[58] Ensour, A. (2015). Jordan 2025. Prime Ministerial Team, Amman, Jordan.

[59] Greening, J. (2016). Supporting  Syria and the Region. Department for International Development, London, United Kingdom.

[60] bin Talal, P.E.H. (2016). 60 Million Refugees: A Crisis That Has Outgrown Its 65-Year-Old Solution. WANA Institute. http://wanainstitute.org/en/blog/60-million-refugees-crisis-has-outgrown-its-65-year-old-solution

[61] Ziade, M. (2016). World Bank approves US$100 million in financing to create 100,000 jobs for Jordanians, Syrian refugees. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/03/27/exceptional-financing-jordan-jobs-syrian-refugees

[62] El Khalil, Z. (2016). Concessional Financing Facility Funds Projects to Support Refugees and Host Communities Impacted by the Syrian Crisis. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/07/28/concessional-financing-facility-funds-projects-to-support-refugees

[63] What Is IDA? (2015). World Bank. https://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-ida

[64] Ghanem, H. Tsitsiragos, D., and Finkelston, K. (2016). Country Partnership Framework for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Period of FY17-FY22 (No. 102746-JO). World Bank Group.

[65] Kanaana, S. (2015). Informally employed Syrian refugees, working under harsh conditions, further strain Jordanian labour market. ILO. http://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_369592/lang–en/index.htm

[66] Marks, J. (2016). Mitigating the Impact of Forced Migration on Syrians. USMEYN. https://www.usmeyouthnetwork.org/2016/05/mitigating-the-impact-of-forced-migration-on-syrians/

[67] Mednick, S. (2016). A push for education and livelihoods for refugees in Jordan. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/a-push-for-education-and-livelihoods-for-refugees-in-jordan-88006

[68] Su, A. (2014). A nation of refugees: Jordan struggles with those fleeing regional crises.

[69] Laub, K. and Malkawi, K. (2016). Jordan Tests Ground for Syria Refugee Jobs Program. NBC New York. http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/Jordan-Test-Ground-for-Large-Jobs-Program-for-Syria-Refugees–371031331.html

[70] Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J., and Omata, N. (2014). Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

[71] Ibid, 4.

[72] Ibid, 8.

[73] Dunmore, C. (2016). Work permit boost gives hope to Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/4/57162b0a6/work-permit-boost-gives-hope-syrian-refugees-jordan.html

[74] Gandolfo, K.L. (2007). Bridging the Economic Gap: The Rise and Fall of the Middle Class in Jordan. The Arab Studies Journal 15/16(2/1), 100–122.

[75] Jaabari, R. (2014). Jordan struggles to manage Syrian refugee crisis – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East. Al-Monitor.  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/jordan-syria-refugees-safe-shelter-tensions.html

[76] Universal Periodic Review: Jordan (2013). UNHCR. http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/513d90172.pdf

[77] Rummery, A. (2016). Access to jobs improving for Syrian refugees in Jordan. UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2016/4/5715ef866/access-jobs-improving-syrian-refugees-jordan.html

Benjamin Lutz
Benjamin Lutz
Benjamin Lutz is a recent graduate from Elon University with a Bachelor’s of Arts in International & Global Studies and Political Science where he concentrated on the Middle East, Peace Studies, and Inter-religious Studies. He is currently enrolled at the University of Bradford for a Master’s of Arts in Middle East Security and Peace and Conflict Studies, after which he plans to permanently move to the Middle East to conduct internal and regional peace diplomacy. His interests in Middle East diplomacy began with an eight-year-long engagement with Model United Nations and Model Arab League. He previously worked as a Research Intern at Generations for Peace, a youth-diplomacy peace-oriented NGO located in Amman, Jordan. You can reach him at [email protected]